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It is well known that research and development (R&D) is an important
engine for economic growth. Also, initial wealth inequality and subsequent
economic growth are well known to be related. This paper links inequality
and R&D-driven growth. It shows that in a class of economies where R&D
is the main engine for growth, di⁄erent wealth groups di⁄er in their desire
for aggregate innovative e⁄orts: the higher the pro￿t share of the individ-
ual￿ s incomes the lower their ideal aggregate R&D and innovation. If rich
shareholders were able to pursue their common interest and to discourage
too much R&D compared, then a pro-labour government able to impose
distortionary progressive taxation, by minimizing the di⁄erence between
the rich and the poor can maximize growth. Such predicted negative rela-
tionship between desired R&D and dynastic wealth is robust to any subsidy
rate lower than 100%.
Keywords: R&D and Growth; Social Preferences for Innovation; In-
equality, Redistribution and Growth. JEL Classi￿cation: O31, O32, O38,
P16, P48.
1. Introduction
In the political economy literature, the relationship between in-
equality and growth has long been studied (Acemoglu 2008), with-
out reference to research and development (R&D), despite the well
known importance of R&D and innovation for economic growth it-
self1. This paper ￿rst computes analytically the ideal steady state
1Notable exceptions are Chou and Talmain (1996) and Foellmi and Zweimueller
(2006), exploiting the elastic labour supply channel and, respectively, the demand
size e⁄ects with non-homotetic preferences. Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) more
recently obtained a positive relationship between taxation and R&D based on the
insurance e⁄ect of progressivity on risk-averse researchers. Potentially positive
e⁄ect of progressivity on R&D cooperation are stressed by Cozzi (2005).Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 2
aggregate growth path for di⁄erent wealth groups, in a simple R&D-
driven growth model a la Jones (1995), and then tests the robustness
of the results under alternative assumptions. I will show that the
higher the family pro￿t share of income (relative to its labour income
share) the lower their preferred aggregate R&D employment. The
reason is that more R&D employment leads to faster innovation and
growth, which is bene￿cial to both wage and pro￿t earners, but it also
implies less manufacturing employment and less pro￿ts in the aggre-
gate, which is detrimental to the pro￿t component of income. The
pro￿t-richer the individual the more important her/his dividend in-
comes, and hence the stronger the perceived negative externality of
aggregate R&D employment.
In so far as richer shareholders are better able to solve their free
riding problems than poor families and to successfully lobby industrial
policy, this model suggests a new channel from more inequality to less
growth and a potentially new channel from wealth redistribution to
growth.
Our results are very robust, as they hold under di⁄erent behav-
ioural and technological scenarios. Therefore we ￿rst obtain them in
Section 2, by assuming constant shares of the labour force employed
in manufacturing and R&D: the reason is the simplicity of exposition.
In Sections 3 and 4 all the results previously obtained in the Solow
framework of Section 2 are con￿rmed in a fully dynamic Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans setting. Section 5 concludes with some observations. The
Appendix contains some of the most cumbersome proofs.
2. An Elementary Golden Rule Analysis
Let us assume2 a unit mass of in￿nitely lived families whose mem-
bers grow at constant rate n > 0. Let cht be the real consumption
2I am indebted to a Referee for suggesting the brilliant expositional style that
follows, including the reference to the Golden Rule.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 3
￿ ow of a member of family h 2 [0;1] at time t. In this stylized econ-
omy each individual is endowed with a unit density of ￿ ow labor that
generates no disutility. Therefore, the labor supply at each date t ￿ 0
is:
Lt = L0e
nt, L0 > 0.
A share 0 ￿ sY t ￿ 1 of the labor force is assumed to be employed in
the manufacturing production, yielding a ￿nal perishable consumption
output of
Yt = AtLtsY t = AtLt (1 ￿ sAt)
consumption goods per unit time. At denotes the stock of productive
knowledge cumulated as of time t, and sAt = 1 ￿ sY t is the share
of labor employed in the research and development (R&D) sector.
Being our analysis highly aggregate, it is not necessary to think of
only one kind of innovative activity: standard methods of Schum-
peterian growth theory (shown by Grossman and Helpman 1991, Jones
2005, Aghion and Howitt 1998, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 2004, Ace-
moglu 2008) could be adopted to render our equations consistent
with economies with improving product quality, improving produc-
tion methods or extending product variety.
Consistently with most R&D-driven growth models, in this section
I will assume that labor appropriates a constant fraction3 0 < ￿ < 1 of
its marginal productivity in the ￿nal consumption production. Hence
real wages are equal to wt = ￿At.
Aggregate pro￿ts are given by:
(1 ￿ ￿)Yt = (1 ￿ ￿)AtLt (1 ￿ sAt).
It therefore follows that gross of R&D aggregate pro￿ts decrease with
the R&D share of labor. In fact, more R&D employment implies less
manufacturing employment, and hence less consumption good rev-
enues and pro￿ts.
3Usually pinned down by the inverse of the monopolistic mark-up.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 4
In this section, we will focus on steady states, i.e. on allocations in
which the shares of labor employed in the manufacturing and in the
R&D are constant: hence we will assume sAt = sA for all t ￿ 0. In
order to guarantee non-negative pro￿ts4:
(1 ￿ ￿)Yt ￿ LtsA￿At = (1 ￿ ￿)AtLt(1 ￿ sA) ￿ LtsA￿At ￿ 0,
that is:
sA ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. (1)





where v > 0 and ￿ < 1. As suggested by Jones (1995 and 2005),
this law of motion of technology departs from the early generation
endogenous growth models, by implying that as technology evolves it
becomes increasingly more complex for innovators to induce equipro-
portional increases in the percapita ￿nal output5. Following Jones
(1995), the long run6 growth rate of per-capita output is:
gY








As well known, Jones￿solution to the strong scale e⁄ect implies
that R&D policy, by a⁄ecting sAt, only a⁄ects the absolute (not the
relative or percentage) long-run growth of productivity, in fact (as-
suming constant shares sAt = sA):
4Alternatively, we could allow negative pro￿ts in so far as the di⁄erence can be
￿nanced by a tax on labour income.
5In fact, the growth rate of Y




A￿ . As knowledge cumulates
A increases and more and more labour is required to invent enough new ideas
compared to their existing stock.
6For a general analysis of the convergence of Jones￿(1995) economy to a bal-
anced growth path, see Arnold (2006).Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 5





Long-run per-capita consumption is:
Yt
Lt
! (1 ￿ sA)
￿










In this economy di⁄erent families have di⁄erent pro￿t incomes.
This can derive from di⁄erent initial wealth levels, that are perpetu-
ated by perfectly diversi￿ed portfolios of R&D ￿rm shares. In fact,
the usual models with vertical and/or horizontal innovation usually
assume that perfectly e¢ cient capital markets allow individual wealth
to evolve deterministically, due to a law of large numbers operating
on a continuum of independent stochastic processes. Therefore, de-
spite perpetual leapfrogging at the industry level7, the personal wealth
distribution evolves deterministic.
Since perfectly diversi￿ed portfolios in bonds or in equities are
actuarially equivalent in this stylized economy, I will work under the
assumption that a scalar ￿h denotes the level of uniform stockholding
of the existing pro￿t generating ￿rms possessed by each family h. A
family with average wealth will have ￿h = 1, a ￿ rich￿will have ￿h > 1,
while a family with below average stock holding ￿h < 1 will be deemed
￿ poor￿ .
Family h￿ s per-member consumption is given by her income:




4(1 ￿ ￿)At(1 ￿ sA)
| {z }
Gross Pro￿ts
￿ sA￿At | {z }
R&D Investment
3







1￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sA)￿h + ￿].
7In fact, our aggregate analysis is consistent with an explicit market for patents,
with R&D being accomplished by separate ￿rms that derive revenue from selling
patents. The market then allocates labour between R&D and manufacturing and,
in the steady state, our results hold.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 6
Notice that eq. (3) decomposes individual income into a labor
component, ￿At, common to everybody, and a pro￿t component,
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sA)At￿h, that increases in the dividend share of the fam-
ily, that is in its relative shareholding. It is important to note that the
higher the pro￿t component the stronger the negative e⁄ect of sA.
Maximizing steady state consumption with respect to sA gives the















It follows from eq. (4) that all wealth groups want a positive R&D
investment, but the richer the individual the lower her desired R&D
investment. The higher the labor share of one￿ s income the higher
her ideal R&D investment, because the bene￿ts in terms of the higher
marginal productivity of labor o⁄set the negative e⁄ects on the pro￿t
level. Also notice that the upper constraint sA ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ implies that
eq. (4) gives an inverted relationship between shareholding and desired
growth only for rich enough wealth groups, i.e. for individuals with
￿h ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ e ￿.
It is useful to remark that, in so far as the GDP share of labor is not
lower than the share of pro￿ts (which is always the case in industri-
alized countries), e ￿ > 1, that is only the relatively rich want slower
growth.
2.1. Subsidies to R&D
After reading the previous section, the reader might have thought
that our main result is due to the fact that the poorer the individual
the lower the R&D investment she has to pay, by indirectly possessingWhy the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 7
the ￿rms in the economy. However, this is not the case: the main mo-
tive for the capitalist households￿opposing too high R&D employment
is their perception of the aggregate negative e⁄ect of R&D employment
on pro￿ts, and this survives any amount of alleviation of individual
direct R&D expenditures. In fact, let us assume that R&D employ-
ment is subsidized at rate ￿ 2 [0;1[. Government budget is balanced:
lump sum taxes are equally imposed on all individuals to fund R&D
subsidies. Family h￿ s per-member consumption would now be given
by her income:
ch = [(1 ￿ ￿)A(1 ￿ sA) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)sA￿A]￿h + ￿A ￿ ￿sA￿. (5)




4(1 ￿ ￿)At(1 ￿ sA)
| {z }
Gross Pro￿ts
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)sA￿At | {z }
R&D Investment
3
5 ￿ ￿h |{z}
Ownership Share







1￿￿ f[(1 ￿ ￿)At(1 ￿ sA) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)sA￿At]￿h +
(1 ￿ ￿sA)￿Atg. (6)






(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿
(2 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿h + ￿￿]
;
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
￿
. (7)
The derivative with respect to ￿h of the ￿rst term in the square
bracket8 is negative everywhere for all ￿ < 1. This proves that no
matter how high - though never equal to 100% - the R&D subsidy rate,
the richer families always want less R&D than the poorer families.
8Equal to
￿￿(1￿￿)
(2￿￿)[(1￿￿￿)￿h+￿￿]2.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 8
2.2. Capital Income Tax and Ideal R&D
Let us now assume that capital incomes - pro￿ts - are taxed at
rate ￿ 2 [0;1[. How would this a⁄ect desired R&D employment? In
order to isolate the e⁄ect of marginal tax rates on desired growth, in
this section I will assume that the tax proceeds are just wasted. That
is, let us assume that individual consumption is given by:
cht = [(1 ￿ ￿)At(1 ￿ sA) ￿ sA￿At]￿h(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿At =
At [(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sA)￿h(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿].
By repeating the same computations as in Section 2, it is straight-















Eq. (8) shows that the desired R&D employment is an increasing
function of the marginal income tax rate. The reason why a more
heavily taxed dividend earner wants more growth is that her after
tax income is more similar to that of the poor. This implies that
her desired R&D employment takes into account her labor incomes
relatively more.
2.3. Ownership versus Skill
If individuals di⁄er in their labour skill endowments, as opposed
to asset ownership, we obtain interesting implications. To view this in
a particularly simple way, I will postulate perfectly persistent ability
shocks (as for example in Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Let us assume
that each member of a household h supplies !h units of labour, where
P(h) is the constant society skill distribution, and
R
!hdP(h) = 1.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 9
Here a "high skill" household has !h > 1 and a "low skill" household
has !h < 1.
If all members of dynasty h are endowed with !h units of labour,
the family h￿ s per-member consumption is now given by
cht = [(1 ￿ ￿)At(1 ￿ sA) ￿ sA￿At]￿h + !h￿At = (9)
At [(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sA)￿h + ￿!h],
which replaces eq. (3). As before we can multiply by the At =constant￿(sAent)
1
1￿￿















Now the link between income and the preferred level of R&D labour
allocation is sharper and depends on the relationship between the
asset distribution and the skill distribution. Parameter
!h
￿h plays a
major role, as it allows us to determine the political preference of an
individual toward R&D by simply considering the ratio of labour to
ownership incomes. The suggested empirical prediction is that the
higher the labour share of someone￿ s income relative to her ownership
share the higher her preference for R&D.
An obvious quali￿cation is that, while it is reasonable to assume
that non-human wealth is inherited, the skill distribution of a family￿ s
o⁄spring is likely more akin to that in society. If this is the case,
eq. (10) has to be integrated over family members according to P(h),
making us re-obtain eq. (4)￿ s predictions despite skill heterogeneity.
An important point is the following: if wealth brings about higher
labour productivity - for several reasons such as better nutrition/health/location,
more human capital, more social capital (family connections), richer
internal knowledge of the workings of the ￿rms, etc. - it is possible
that !h be positively correlated with ￿h. Then depending of the kind
of correlation our results could be either strengthened or weakened.
For example, assume we had estimated a linear model characterized
by !h = a + b￿h, with a > 0 being the minimum labour skill of theWhy the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 10
poorest and b > 0 measuring the increase in skill associated with ￿rm





























Clearly eq. (11) generates a negative correlation between ￿rm owner-
ship and desired R&D employment, the more so the higher the labour
endowment of the poorest.
3. A Fully Dynamic Political Equilibrium
In this section, I will show that the main qualitative result of the
previous sections￿simple Golden Rule analysis carries through to the
fully dynamic version a la Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans, in which the R&D
policy - sA - is not restricted to be constant from the beginning. We
will instead assume that each wealth group h decides its most preferred
R&D policy as the time trajectory sA(￿) that maximizes its welfare
from the beginning of time on. Individual preferences are represented





where ￿ > 0 is the subjective rate of time preferences, satisfying 0 <














Lt = nLt, (13)Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 11
where A0, and L0 are given and positive, and ￿h0 are non-negative
numbers. The following holds:
The following hold:
Lemma 1 The dynamic equilibrium family shares of aggregate pro￿ts
are constant: ￿ht = ￿h0 ￿ ￿h for all t ￿ 0 and for all h.
Focussing - without loss of generality - on wealth classes such that
inequality (1) holds strict, we obtain:
Proposition 2 The dynamic equilibrium chosen by each household is










+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
. (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Eq. (14) shows that a household￿ s preferred long-run R&D share of
the labour force is a decreasing function of its pro￿t share. The value
added by the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans logic followed in this section
is in the presence of the subjective rate of time preference ￿ in the
denominator: the more patient the households (the lower ￿) the higher
their desired growth enhancing policy. Comparing eq.s (14) and (4)
we see how the conclusions of our Golden Rule exercise do not di⁄er
qualitatively from the more sophisticated analysis of this section. In
particular, the ratio of the most prefererred policies of two households















+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
in both cases.
By re-de￿ning inequality in terms of heterogeneous labour skill
as well as initial wealth, as in eq. (9), and by repeating the same
derivations9 we easily get to the following counterpart of eq. (10):
9Notice that eq. (25) holds anyway.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 12
Corollary 3 If the individuals di⁄er in their labour skills, as assumed










+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
. (15)
Like eq. (10), eq. (15) shows that the larger the unskill related
source of wealth
￿h
!h the weaker the desire for innovation-enhancing
policies. In case skill and ownership be correlated, similar considera-
tions could be made here as were made in the discussion of eq. (11).
It is important to remark that our conclusions about R&D pol-
icy preferences and inequality are not restricted to the speci￿c utility
function adopted. In fact the following holds:
Corollary 4 All our qualitative conclusions are valid for a general
CRRA utility function with ￿nite intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4. Alternative Laws of Motion of Technology in Fully Dy-
namic Equilibrium
4.1. Schumpeterian Knowledge Production Function
We can easily test our results under an equally important and
alternative law of motion of technology suggested by a number of au-
thors (Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995, Young, 1998, Peretto,
1998, Dinopoulous and Thompson, 1998, and Howitt, 1999) and sup-
ported by recent empirical analysis (Madsen, 2008, Ha and Howitt,
2007). This is a way out of the "strong scale e⁄ect" prediction of
early generation endogenous growth models, that maintains endoge-
nous growth by assuming that the larger population the more dilutedWhy the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 13



















Lt = nLt, (18)
where A0, and L0 are given and positive, and ￿h0 are non-negative
numbers.
The following hold:
Proposition 5 The dynamic equilibrium level of sA preferred by house-














As in Jones￿(1995) "semi-endogenous" solution to the strong scale
e⁄ect, also in this case the higher the pro￿t share of someone￿ s income
the less growth promoting her ideal policy.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 14
4.2. Updating Costs
As a further test of robustness, we can check what happens if we
account for positive research updating time costs, as modelled by Cozzi
(2003) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2004) to be decreasing in productivity,
due to increasingly better information and communication technology.
In fact, in order for a researcher to target innovation correctly, he or
she must ￿rst make sure to get informed and to understand the most
recent new developments in his or her particular ￿elds. Amending the
previous models by assuming that the labour cost of updating each
researcher￿ s knowledge is c


















Focussing on wealth levels such that inequality (1) holds strict, we
obtain:







This paper has analytically proved that - in the generality of the
scale e⁄ect free R&D-driven growth technological assumptions - the
R&D share of aggregate employment desired by every wealth groupWhy the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 15
di⁄ers in a regular way: the more pro￿t-rich the household lower its
ideal aggregate R&D employment.
This paper has also showed that the higher pro￿t tax rates the
higher the aggregate R&D employment desired by each wealth group,
thereby suggesting a positive relationship between marginal income
tax rates and pro-innovation social attitude. The reason is that,
though pro￿ts and wages gain in the same proportion from total factor
productivity growth, the larger the relative weight of pro￿ts in some-
one￿ s income the stronger the negative e⁄ect of diverting people from
pro￿table manufacturing ￿rms to R&D laboratories.
Future research may develop this point further. For example, if in
the real world the rich shareholders are able to lobby the private sector
at least to some extent, this model recreates the negative relationship
between inequality and growth and the positive relationship between
marginal tax rates and growth found in some empirical studies such
as Perotti (1996).Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 16
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The problem can be analyzed in two stages.
First characterize the rational expectations equilibrium for each R&D
policy, and then maximize the household welfare with respect to that
policy. At any time t ￿ 0 each household knows that everyone in the













t (r￿￿n)d￿ds ￿ aht, (22)
where r(t) denotes time t￿ s real rate of return, common to all assets
(consumer loans, ￿rm stocks and bonds) viewed as perfect substitutes
by the consumer; and aht denotes household wealth. Clearly:
:
aht = ahtrt + wht ￿ cht. (23)
Standard methods imply the Euler equation:
:
cht = cht (rt ￿ ￿)
and hence - after solving it - chs = chte
R s













t (￿￿n)d￿ds ￿ aht, (24)
which - due to non-satiatiated preferences - implies: cht = (￿ ￿
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which implies that
aht




ah0trt stays constant, which implies zero equilibrium consumer loans








At (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sAt)￿ht







￿htdP(h) = 1, it follows that ￿ht = ￿h0 for all t ￿ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Based on the previous Lemma 1, we can
assume constant shares from the beginning of time. The ￿rst order
conditions for an optimum are:
￿h






















where ￿t is the current value costate variable and the transversal-
ity condition becomes limt!1 ￿tAt = 0. De￿ning xt ￿ A
￿￿1
t Lt and
yt ￿ ￿tAt we can reduce the dimensionality of this system -thereby
stationarizing it - obtaining:
￿h
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sAt)￿h + ￿!h
= ytvxt, (27)
:
xt = xt [n ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)vsAtxt], (28)
:
yt = yt [￿ ￿ n + (1 ￿ ￿)vsAtxt] ￿ 1. (29)


























￿ 2 + ￿. (31)




























































and its determinant is clearly negative. Therefore there are two real
eigenvalues of opposite sign: hence the equilibrium is determinate.
Proof of Corollary 4. Simply repeat all the steps we have made,








￿(￿￿n)tdt,Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 19
where ￿ > 0 is a parameter. The crucial part is the following: instead
of ￿rst order conditions (26), we now have
￿tvA
￿
t Lt = A
1￿￿



















and the transversality condition. De￿ning xt ￿ A
￿￿1
t Lt and yt ￿ ￿tA
￿
t
we can reduce the dimensionality of this system - thereby stationariz-
ing it - obtaining:
vsAtxt =
sAt￿h
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sAt)￿h + ￿!h











= ￿ ￿ n + (￿ ￿ ￿)vsAtxt ￿




In a steady state
:
xt
xt = 0, and hence eq. (35) implies that sAtx does
not change with ￿h. Consequently,
:
yt
yt = 0, and hence eq. (36) implies
that [(1￿￿￿sAt)￿h+￿!h]
1￿￿
y does not change with ￿h. These results and
eq. (34) imply that
sAt￿h
(1￿￿￿sAt)￿h+￿!h does not change with ￿h. Hence,
since
sAt￿h
(1￿￿￿sAt)￿h+￿!h is an increasing function of both sAt and ￿h, the
implicit function theorem implies that
@sAt
@￿h < 0. Therefore the optimal
steady state share of R&D employment is a decreasing function of the
pro￿t share of the family, at least locally.
Proof of Proposition 5. Based on the previous Lemma 1, we can
assume constant shares from the beginning of time. The ￿rst order
conditions for an optimum are:Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 20
￿h
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sAt)￿h + ￿!h
= ￿tvAt,
:








and the transversality condition. De￿ning yt ￿ ￿tAt we can reduce the
dimensionality of this system -thereby stationarizing it - obtaining:
￿h
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ sAt)￿h + ￿!h
= vyt, (37)
:
yt = yt (￿ ￿ n) ￿ 1. (38)
Notice that (38) is unstable, hence there is no transitional dynam-
ics10 for yt and hence for sAt. Hence yt jumps immediately to its steady
state value 1
(￿￿n), which (plugged into 37) allows us to easily solve for
the unique constant value of sAt stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6. Based on the previous Lemma 1, we can
assume constant shares from the beginning of time. The ￿rst order
conditions for an optimum are:
￿h






















10As is generally the case with this "endogenous growth" solution, which, once
reduced in dimensionality, behaves exactly as in the original Grossm and Help-
man￿ s (1991a and b) case.Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less (revised version) 21
and the transversality condition. De￿ning yt ￿ ￿tAt, as before, we
reduce the dimensionality of this system, obtaining:
￿h






yt = yt (￿ ￿ n) ￿ 1. (40)
Since eq. (40) is unstable, there is no transitional dynamics for
yt, and hence for sAt. Hence yt jumps immediately to its steady state
value 1
(￿￿n), which (plugged into 39) allows us to implicitly di⁄erentiate
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